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CONDEMNATION BY CITY OF STREET WITHIN OTHER
MUNICIPALITY ENJOINED ON THE PLEADINGS
Village of Blue Ash v. City of Cincinnati
173 Ohio St. 345, 182 N.E.2d 557 (1962)
The village of Blue Ash brought suit to enjoin condemnation proceedings
initiated by the city of Cincinnati to appropriate a public street within the
corporate limits of Blue Ash for the establishment of an airport. The prop-
erty near the street had been purchased by Cincirnati before Blue Ash be-
came incorporated. The proposed construction plans required the bisecting
of the street by the principal runway, and there was no feasible alternative
location for the airport or the runway. Cincinnati offered Blue Ash adjacent
property owned by Cincinnati over which the street could be relocated. The
court of common pleas sustained a demurrer to Cincinnati's answer,1 but the
court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court of Ohio, with two judges dis-
senting, reversed for Blue Ash, holding that a general grant of power from
the legislature to municipal corporations would be improperly exceeded in an
appropriation of property already in public use in another municipality where
the appropriation would wholly defeat the present public use of the property.
Therefore, the court held, injunctive relief was a matter of strict right.2
The case is one of first impression in Ohio, and no decisions on the pre-
cise question involved could be found by the writer in other jurisdictions. Of
course, the village of Blue Ash has a right to the use of its streets,3 and it
exercises a governmental function in the maintenance and control of these
streets.4 But municipal corporations have been granted the power to acquire
property, within or without corporate limits, for the purpose of establishing
airports and other public utilities.5 It is well-established that property al-
l The court treated a motion to strike Cincinnati's second amended answer as a
demurrer.
2 Village of Blue Ash v. City of Cincinnati, 173 Ohio St. 345, 182 N.E.2d 557 (1962).
3 Ohio Const. art. XVIII, § 3 (1912) ; Ohio Rev. Code § 723.01 (1953).
4 Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. City of Fremont, 164 Ohio St. 344, 131 N.E.2d 221
(1955) ; City of Wooster v. Arhens, 116 Ohio St. 281, 156 N.E. 210 (1927).
1; Ohio Const. art. XVIII, § 4 (1912) provides:
Any municipality may acquire, construct, own, lease and operate within or with-
out its corporate limits, any public utility the product or service of which is or
is to be supplied to the municipality or its inhabitants, and may contract with
others for any such product or service. The acquisition of any such public utility
may be by condemnation or otherwise, and a municipality may acquire thereby
the use of, or full title to, the property and franchise of any company or person
supplying to the municipality or its inhabitants the service or product of any
such utility.
Ohio Rev. Code § 717.01 (1953), reads in part:
Each municipal corporation may:
(V) Acquire by . . . condemnation proceedings, or otherwise, real or personal
property . . . to establish, construct . . . equip, maintain and operate airports,
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ready in public use cannot be acquired for a different public purpose where
the proposed use will destroy or materially impair the existing use, except by
an express grant from the legislature or where it is implied by necessity from
a general grant of power.6 This rule has been reiterated by the Ohio courts7
as well as those of other states.8 Generally, however, where the proposed use
of the property is of greater benefit to the public than the existing use, acquisi-
tion of the public land has been upheld where no limitation applicable to the
proposed use was expressed in the grant by the legislature.9 Although the
power granted in Ohio Revised Code section 717.01 is not expressly extended
to property already in public use in a neighboring municipality, there is no
limitation in the statute which would prevent the exercise of the power pro-
posed in the instant case.' 0 Therefore, it would appear that Cincinnati might
have the power to acquire the street owned by Blue Ash, depending upon the
merits of its case and the balance of interests involved.
In a recent Ohio case a county sought to appropriate, for the construc-
tion of an airport, a twenty-three acre tract of land which an incorporated
village within the county had acquired for a recreational park and the con-
struction of municipal buildings. The county appropriation was upheld ex-
cept for that portion of the tract necessary for the construction of the
municipal buildings. The decision was based on a balancing of the benefits
and inconveniences to the parties. The county and the village were on a
co-equal basis in terms of constitutional power, yet the case was heard on the
merits, and decided by balancing the competing interests of the governmental
units involved."
The theory of the right of eminent domain is based on an .overwhelming
public need for the land which is appropriated. The owner's constitutional
rights must necessarily be interfered with, and the justification for the inter-
landing fields, . . . either within or without the limits of a municipal corpora-
tion .... No municipal corporation may take or disturb property or facilities
belonging to any public utility, or to a common carrier which property or facili-
ties are required for the proper and convenient operation of such utility or car-
rier, unless provision is made for the restoration, relocation or duplication of such
property or facilities elsewhere at the sole cost of the municipal corporation.
See also Ohio Rev. Code § 719.01(0) (1953).
6 Byfield v. City of Newton, 247 Mass. 46, 141 N.E. 658 (1923); Northern Pac. Ry.
v. City of Duluth, 153 Minn. 122, 189 N.W. 937 (1922); Twin City Power Co. v.
Savannah River Electric Co., 163 S.C. 438, 161 S.E. 750 (1930).
7 Board of Educ. of City of Akron v. Proprietors of Akron Rural Cemetery, 110
Ohio St. 430, 144 N.E. 113 (1924); Cincinnati, S. & C.R.R. v. Belle Centre, 48 Ohio St.
273, 27 N.E. 464 (1891).
8 See cases cited note 6 supra.
9 If granting an injunction will cause more harm to the defendant than benefit to the
plaintiff, it should generally be refused. See Goodall v. Crofton, 33 Ohio St. 271, 31 Am.
Rep. 535 (1878).
10 See authorities cited note 5 supra.
11 Village of Richmond Heights v. Board of County Comm'rs, 112 Ohio App. 272,
166 N.E.2d 143 (1960), appeal dismissed, 171 Ohio St. 449, 172 N.E.2d 133 (1961), noted
13 W. Res. L. Rev. 510 (1962); 12 W. Res. L. Rev. 516 (1961).
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ference is that the power to acquire property is essential to state administra-
tion if it is to function effectively for the welfare of the public. If it is also
in the public interest to protect the rights of the present owner of the prop-
erty, the conflict is resolved by a consideration of the circumstances and a
balancing of the interests involved to determine whether there is such a para-
mount need for the property that the rights of the owner must be sacrificed
for the greater public interest. Why should there be a distinction where the
owner of the land is a municipal corporation? The fact that Blue Ash is on
a co-equal basis with Cincinnati would no doubt be an important factor in
the court's decision in the instant case, but it should be merely another cir-
cumstance to be considered. If the instant case had been heard on the merits,
the court might have found that the .proposal of Cincinnati to relocate and
reconstruct the highway in question would avert the destruction or material
alteration of the present public use.12 The court viewed the proposed use of
the property as entirely destroying the existing use. But since the purpose of
the street is to provide a convenient passageway for traffic, it would seem that
a suitable alternate location for the street would certainly avoid the destruc-
tion of its usefulness. It is difficult to see how the usefulness of a street could
be so tied to a given location that, as a matter of law, any relocation would
be tantamount to destruction of the street. Cincinnati alleged that a suitable
alternate route was available, and this allegation was admitted by the court
for the purpose of sustaining the demurrer. Should not the court have ex-
amined this alternate route before ruling that relocation would result in the
destruction of the usefulness of the existing roadway?
The constitutional grant of power could be so interpreted to imply the
power to acquire the property in question, notwithstanding the present public
use.13 This result could be reached on the theory of implied necessity in the
statute granting the power. Because of the large area required for the estab-
lishment of an airport, the power to appropriate land already in public use
can be properly inferred from the statute. The legislature must have intended
to provide municipalities with the power to acquire land necessary for the
construction of airports within a reasonable distance from the city. The
length of runways necessary for a modern airport is rapidly increasing and
will soon reach four miles."4 Municipalities may find themselves hard-pressed
to acquire suitable locations without interfering with state and city thorough-
fares. If the acquisition of the only possible location available requires the
condemnation of a street within another municipality, then the power to take
must be implied from the purpose for which the statute was enacted.' 5 This
12 Fry v. Jackson, 264 S.W. 612 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924), which upheld the condemna-
tion of a county road by a municipality where the alternate route was six miles away.
13 See authorities cited note 5 supra.
14 Note, "Zoning-The Airport and the Land Surrounding It in the Jet Age," 48 Ky.
L.J. 273 (1960).
15 Village of Richmond Heights v. Board of County Comm'rs, supra note 11, at 281,
166 N.E.2d at 150:
Thus, when the only land available for a particular public work is already
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interpretation seems particularly applicable to the instant case, because Cin-
cinnati stated that the proposed airport could not be constructed without the
acquisition of the street in question, and this allegation alone should be
sufficient to warrant a trial on the merits.
An unusual approach to a problem similar to the one raised by the princi-
pal case was taken by the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut which
held that public streets are within the scope of the word land under a grant
of power from the legislature authorizing Railroad Commissioners to appro-
priate land for the construction of railroad stations. The controversy arose
over the condemnation of portions of three city streets by the Railroad Com-
missioners. When the city attempted to enjoin the condemnation, the court
took the view that streets and highways are public easements in land, and
cannot exist separately from the land. Accordingly, streets were held to be
part of the land included in the grant of power.16 This interpretation would
put the acquisition of public streets within the power expressly granted to the
Railroad Commissioners by the legislature. If applied to the instant case,
such an interpretation would remove the existing public use as a bar to the
appropriation.' 7 The theory applied by the Connecticut courts attempts to
distinguish the interest of the municipality in its streets from that in other
property in public use. This distinction would probably be rejected in Ohio
on the basis that the interest of a municipality in city streets is more than a
mere easement,' 8 but the case is illustrative of the variety of holdings which
have supported the right to condemn public streets within a municipal
corporation.
The dissenting opinion in the instant case considers the grant under
article XVIII, section 4 of the Ohio Constitution as an unqualified or plenary
one,' 9 subject only to the consideration of a greater public need.20 There are
many cases in Ohio supporting this view,21 and since no express limitations
on the power appear in the grant which affect the instant case, there should
be no constitutional bar to the appropriation of the street by Cincinnati.22
devoted to the public use, the power to take it may be inferred from a compari-
son of the conflicting powers conferred by the statute as well as the nature of
the public works respectively to be undertaken.
See also Old Colony R.R. v. Framingham Water Co., 53 Mass. 561, 27 N.E. 662 (1891);
In Matter of Application of Mayer, 135 N.Y. 253, 31 N.E. 1043 (1892).
16 State ex rel. New Haven & D. R.R. v. Railroad Comm'rs, 65 Conn. 308, 15 At.
756 (1888). Accord, Lime Rock R.R. v. Farnsworth, 86 Me. 127, 29 Ati. 958 (1894);
Cullen v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 66 Conn. 211,33 Ati. 911 (1895).
17 "Real property," rather than "land," are the words used in Ohio Rev. Code
§ 717.01 (V) (1953).
'8 Hamilton, G. & C. Traction Co. v. Parish, 67 Ohio St. ISI, 65 N.E. 1011 (1902).
19 See text of section at note 5 supra.
20 Dissenting opinion of Bell, J., Village of Blue Ash v. City of Cincinnati, supra
note 2, at 354, 182 N.E.2d at 563.
21 See, e.g., Swank v. Vihiage of Shiloh, 166 Ohio St. 415, 143 N.E.2d 586 (1957);
Pfau v. City of Cincinnati, 142 Ohio St. 101, 50 N.E.2d 172 (1943).
22 The right of eminent domain can be restricted only by legislative enactment or
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The fact that section 717.01 was enacted when the problems of modern
airport expansion had become apparent lends support to this argument. The
legislature expressly restricted the power where the condemnation would ad-
versely affect a public utility or common carrier.2 3 Since the legislature con-
sidered in what instances the power should be restricted, and included only
those instances mentioned, it must have been intended that the power of
condemnation should extend to all cases not so restricted. However, assuming
a restriction against condemnation of land in adjoining municipal corporations
could be implied as a limitation on section 717.01, it would even then be
unreasonable to extend greater protection to property falling within an im-
plied restriction than is afforded by the legislature where the power is limited
by express provision. Thus, since the statute permits the power of condemna-
tion to extend even to the property of public utilities and common carriers
where the condemning municipality adequately provides for the relocation of
the facility, it would appear that Cincinnati's proposal to relocate the street
in question should be sufficient to support Cincinnati's answer against a
demurrer.
Blue Ash asserts a right to keep its streets free from appropriation by an
adjacent municipality, and relies on section 3, article XVIII of the Ohio
Constitution which grants municipalities the authority to exercise the powers
of local self-government and such local police regulations as are not in conflict
with general laws. The maintenance of city streets by a municipality is in-
cluded among the powers of local self-government2 4 which, by the Home-Rule
Amendment,25 are superior to general laws of the state so far as their opera-
tion within the municipality is concerned 3 But Cincinnati derives its power
to acquire property for the construction of public utilities from article XVIII,
section 4 of the Constitution of Ohio as well as section 717.01.27 The court
took the position that condemnation of such large areas of land as are re-
quired for modern airports was not within the contemplation of the framers
of article XVIII, section 4 in 1912 when that section was adopted. But since
airports are clearly public utilities,2 8 it seems unreasonable that the legislature
intended to restrict the wording exclusively to those types of public utilities
in existence in 1912. Furthermore, in spite of the amount of property re-
quired by modern airports, railroads were condemning much greater land
areas for essentially similar public purposes even earlier than 1912.
It would seem upon objective reflection and from a practical standpoint
that the rapid expansion of urban areas and the increasing migration to sub-
constitutional amendment. Ellis v. Turnpike Comm'n, 162 Ohio St. 86, 120 N.E.2d 719
(1954); Pontiac Improvement Co. v. Board of Comm'rs, 104 Ohio St. 447, 135 N.E. 635
(1922).
23 See statutes cited note 5 supra.
24 Village of Perrysberg v. Ridgeway, 108 Ohio St. 245, 140 N.E. 595 (1923).
26 Ohio Const. art. XVIII, § 3 (1912).
26 Fitzgerald v. Cleveland, 88 Ohio St. 338, 103 N.E. 512 (1913).
27 See text of statute at note 5 supra.
28 City of Toledo v. Board of Tax Appeals, 143 Ohio St. 141, 54 N.E.2d 656 (1944).
1963]
426 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
urban communities will intensify the need for further public appropriations
of land. A suburban community, by incorporation, can put itself on a co-equal
basis with the parent metropolis solely for the purpose of obstructing con-
demnation proceedings initiated by the metropolis. Therefore, the courts
should at least consider the merits of a case for the condemnation of property
for a purpose which would benefit the entire metropolitan area. The constitu-
tional rights of a municipal corporation must in all respects be protected, but
if a greater public need is present and a suitable alternative for the prior use
can be provided, the fact that a community has become incorporated should
not prohibit an acquisition of its land by another community without a con-
sideration of the merits of the case.
